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Abstract 
 
In the wake of Abenomics, new regulations based on the “comply or explain” principle 
were introduced to alter the deep-rooted relational shareholding (seisaku-hoyu) 
practice among Japanese firms. The stewardship code encourages institutional 
investors to engage in corporate management, and one of the guidelines of such 
engagement is the management of a firm’s financial policy, such as the firm’s 
securities holding and payout policy. Regarding relational shareholding, the Corporate 
Governance Code introduced stricter corporate disclosure requirements, including 
guidelines for the self-assessment of appropriateness and the economic rationale for 
relational shareholding. We explore the consequences of the new regulation by using 
unique data on firms with high relational shareholding (the so called bedrock firms, 
“Ganban Kigyo”). Our results provide evidence that following the reforms, Japanese 
corporations began to actively sell relational shareholding. The incentive to sell 
relational shareholdings was constrained by intercorporate relationships. However, 
this constraint was also mitigated after the reforms. We also provide evidence that 
despite the expected outcome of Abenomics, corporate policies in firms that reduced 
their relational shareholding are likely to result in an increase in cash holdings and in 
dividend payouts, while R&D, M&A and CAPX will be left unaffected. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Regulation, Ownership Structures, Relational shareholding, Cross-
Shareholding, Corporate Governance Code, Stewardship Code.  
JEL classification: G30; G32; G38; L20; K22 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of Abenomics, by implementing a series of reforms based on the comply or 
explain rule, the Japanese government set out to regulate the relational shareholding, 
which is an unique features of the ownership structure of Japanese firms1.  Relational 
shareholding is different proactice from the portfolio investment of firms, which aim is 
to maximize the share value. The aim of relational shareholding is not limited to 
maximize share value, but either to maintain the control power over or keeping long-
term relationship to firms in which they invested.  
Assuming that the relational shareholding could result in inefficient capital use, 
as well as making it possible for incumbent manager to be severely entrenched from 
the pressure of capital market. Japan's Corporate Governance Code (hereafter, CGC) 
requires full disclosure on the policy for holding shares in other listed companies, 
including an assessment of whether or not cross-shareholding can be reduced as well 
as its appropriateness (CGC, Principle 1.4). Additionally, the Japanese version of the 
Stewardship Code (hereafter JSC) introduced in 2014 required that institutional 
shareholders, such as trust banks, insurance firms, and asset management firms, as 
well as final asset owners, such as the GPIF (Government Pension Investment Fund), 
should actively engage in the firm’s business management. One of main principles of 
such engagement is to oversee each company’s financial (asset) policy, such as its 
relational shareholding and payout policy. 
Historically, the stance of the government and the regulatory authorities toward 
relational shareholding had basically been promotional and by the early 1990s, it was 
at least neutral. It was just after the banking crisis in 1997 that the stance changed 
from a pro-relational to an anti-relational shareholding stance. A seminal event was 
the enactment in 2001 of the Act on Limitation on Shareholding by Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions, which had an enormous impact on the shareholding policies of 
                                                 
1
 Representative works are Aoki (1990), Flath (1993), Odagiri (1994), Sheard (1994),  Yosha and 
Yafeh (2004), Miyajima and Kuroki (2007), Franks, Mayer and Miyajima (2014). 
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banks and resulted in the rapid dissolution of cross-shareholding between banks and 
firms (Miyajima and Kuroki 2007). 
After the dramatic change of the ownership structure among Japanese firms by 
the middle 2000s, the relational shareholding of nonfinancial firms and consequently 
the cross-shareholding among corporations was relatively stable again. In the middle 
2010s, on the TSE, corporations held 22.6% of the total issued stock, while in 1996, 
corporations held 25.6% of the issued stock. Similarly, after the middle 2000s, the 
estimated cross-shareholding ratio among TSE firms remained stable at 9%.  
In 2012, the new prime minister Abe and his cabinet launched a policy effort to 
reduce relational shareholding and dissolve cross-shareholding once again, implicitly 
assuming that the high level of relational shareholding of firms and cross-
shareholding would have a negative impact on corporate performance by deteriorating 
the efficient use of capital and preventing the top management of firms from facing the 
pressures of a capital market.  
However, it is not clear whether this assumption is correct. In theory, if relational 
shareholding enables top management to commit themselves to long-term 
management policies, the policy to reduce relational shareholding may have a 
negative impact on corporate behaviors.  Moreover, increasing short-term investments 
by less committed investors has induced myopic decision-making, which is still a 
major Anglo-American economic concern (Stein, 1988, Porter 1992, 1994, Almeida et 
al. 2016). 
Even if this assumption is correct, more importantly, it is not clear whether the 
governance reforms, such as the CGC and JSC, are effective enough to boost the 
reduction of relational shareholding, as these reforms are not mandatory. Note that 
the drastic dissolution of cross-shareholding between banks and firms in the early 
2000s was realized due to a new powerful mandatory regulation, i.e., the law of 
Restriction of Bank Shareholding. Instead, the CGC and JSC serve as 
recommendations, i.e., soft laws, which are based on the comply or explain principle. 
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The question of whether and to what extent the comply or explain type regulation will 
impact the current high level of relational shareholding therefore remains open.  
Assuming the soft-law reforms were effective enough to dissolve as originally 
intended the relational shareholding, it still raises the question of how this newly 
acquired money from selling relational shareholding assets has been utilized. A 
productive way of using this money could be to reinvest it in either physical 
investments, R&D or M&A, which denote the exact investment objectives that 
Abenomics wanted to achieve. Furthermore, such funds could also be used to increase 
dividend payouts or to make stock repurchases. This is an efficient use of money if a 
firm does not have enough growth opportunities.  Conversely, such funds may also 
remain unutilized and could increase a firm’s cash holdings.  
The task of this paper is to address the issues discussed above．To answer these 
questions, we take the following three steps. The first and preliminary step is to test, 
by using the entire First Section of the TSE as a sample for the period 2005 to 2017, 
whether the CG reforms had any significant impact on cross-shareholding. Our results 
provide evidence that consistent with the observations of previous studies, both foreign 
and domestic institutional investors are significantly associated with lower cross-
shareholding. We also find that regarding cross-shareholding among companies, the 
CG reforms have a had a significant impact, decreasing cross-shareholding by 
approximately 0.5% to 0.7%. Taking cross-shareholding as a dependent variable is an 
indirect way for testing the policy effect because changes in cross shareholding are not 
limited to nor determined by the decision of the shareholders.       
As a second step, focusing on the high-relational shareholding companies, which 
are often called bedrock companies (“ganban kigyo”) and are the implicit target of the 
CG reforms, we examine the impact of CG reforms and compare the determinants 
promoting relational shareholding before and after the reforms. The sample consists of 
200 randomly selected firms listed on the First Section of the TSE and that are in the 
top 25% of firms in terms of the percentage of relational shareholding to total assets.  
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First, we find that the CG reforms have had a strong positive effect on dissolving 
the relational shareholding of firms. This magnitude translates to an increase from 2.5 
company assets sold in the pre-reform period to 3.4 company assets sold in the post-
reform period. Interestingly, different from the preliminary test, we found that the 
decision to sell relational shareholdings is negatively co-related to institutional 
shareholding, suggesting that the pressure of intuitional shareholders is not a driver 
but an obstacle to dissolving relational shareholding among those bedrock firms. We 
also find that after the CG reforms, this effect is still continuing and has become 
rather exaggerated. 
Second, we test the determinants of the firms’ selling of individual relational 
shares, explicitly considering cross-shareholding. In deciding whether to sell specific 
relational shareholdings, the average likelihood of corporate management adhering to 
the CG reforms increased from 6.6% in the 2010 to 2013 period to 14% in the 2014 to 
2017 period. Furthermore, a decision of a firm is significantly constrained via cross-
shareholding. However, after the CG reforms, we also find that this effect is mitigated 
to some extent when we examine the interaction between the CG reforms and cross-
shareholdings. In this regard, the comply or explain type of regulation is evidently 
influential.   
In the last part of this paper, as the third step of our analysis, we address 
whether a decision to sell the relational assets has had a significant impact on 
corporate policies, such as share buybacks, dividend payouts, physical investments 
(CAPX), R&D expenditures and M&A decisions. We find that companies that sold 
relational assets are more inclined to increase dividend payouts and to conduct share 
buybacks, but there is no evidence that they increased CAPX, R&D and M&A.  As a 
result, they associated with increasing cash holding. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview 
of the stance of the regulatory authority toward relational shareholding. Section 3 
summarizes the relation of relational shareholding and cross-share shareholding and 
in a preliminary test, reports what determines the cross-shareholding ratio. Section 4 
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addresses the determinants of relational shareholding decision-making, examining the 
activities of companies with a high level of relational shareholding assets. Section 5 
examines the impact of a decision to sell relational assets on corporate policies. Section 
6 concludes. 
 
2  THE RISE AND FALL OF RELATIONAL/CROSS-SHAREHOLDING 
The unique Japanese insider-dominated ownership structure appeared during the 
post-war reform era, and gradually evolved during the high growth era. In the post-
war reforms, when GHQ implemented an initiative to dissolve the pyramidal 
concentrated ownership structure known as zaibatsu, the Japanese government took a 
clear pro-relational stance on shareholding in order to mitigate the shocks of the post-
war drastic reforms. Former zaibatsu-affiliated firms, which were suddenly exposed to 
strong myopic market pressures under the dispersed ownership, sought to stabilize 
their ownership structure via existing corporate relationships. When the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange reopened in 1949, these firms bought each other’s shares. In this process, 
the government and financial authorities encouraged insurance companies and other 
corporations to purchase each other’s company stocks (Miyajima 1994, 1995).  
This movement was increasingly accelerated subsequent to the anti-trust law 
amendment, which deregulated shareholding by corporation and banks, in 1949 and 
1953. The Asset Revaluation Act (Shisan Saihyoka-ho) in 1950 and the Compulsory 
Asset Revaluation Act (Shihon-Jujitsu-ho) in 1954 exacerbated the problem, as these 
acts provided another mechanism that encouraged insider ownership by allowing 
ﬁrms to revalue their assets to current value (equivalent to replacement cost). This 
resulted in a decrease of leverage and a corresponding increase in reserves, which 
provided a source of free distributions to shareholders in the form of bonuses issued in 
the 1950s and early 1960s (Dakiawase-zoshi)2. According to Tokyo Stock Exchange 
statistics, the proportion of free distributions in total equity issuance was 17.9% from 
                                                 
2
  See in detail, Miyajima (2004) 
8 
 
1950–1955 and 15.6% from 1956–1960 (Ministry of Finance 1978, 608).  Those 
contributed to the gradual increase of insider ownership as is shown in Figure 1. 
 
== Figure 1 about here == 
 
The next notable phase occurred in the middle of the 1960s. It is well documented 
that in 1965, the stock market collapsed due to excess new seasoned issues. Facing a 
stock price decline, ﬁnancial institutions backed by financial authorities set up two 
price-keeping organizations, namely, the Japan Joint Securities Company (JJSC) and 
the Japan Securities Holding Union (JSHU). JJSC purchased shares in the open 
market to stabilize the equity market, and JSHU, with the help of funds supplied by 
the Bank of Japan, acquired stocks from investment trusts and securities companies. 
By 1965, these two institutions had purchased 5% of the equity of all listed companies 
and held, on average, 5.8% of the ordinary shares of the top 100 companies (a 
maximum stake of 15.6% and a minimum stake of 0.01%) 3 . When the two 
organizations began to liquidate their frozen shares in 1968, the banks and other 
companies purchased their large proportion, creating the cross-holdings that were to 
be used to protect companies against hostile control changes arising from the opening 
of the Japanese stock market to foreign investors. These two organizations sold 37.2% 
of their shares to insiders, and if insurance companies are included, the proportion 
rises to 52.2%. (Franks, Mayer and Miyajima 2014, hereafter FMM 2014). 
The third and final phase in which relational/cross-shareholding was established 
was from 1969 until 1973 and coincided with the issuance of a signiﬁcant number of 
new seasoned equity offerings through the placement of shares. This practice was 
supported by a rule change in 1966 that permitted Japanese companies to sell shares 
at a discount to third-party shareholders without offering pre-emption rights to 
existing shareholders (FMM 2014). For new seasoned issues, this legal amendment 
                                                 
3
  For more information on this, see Miyajima, Haramura, and Enami (2003), Kawakita (1995), 
Prowse (1990), Nikami (1990), The top 100 firms’ estimation is based on Franks, Mayer and 
Miyajima 2014). 
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allowed ﬁrms to allot their new issued shares to friendly third parties. As result, the 
aggregate share held by banks and other corporation increased from 50.3% in 1970 to 
58.5% in 1973.  
All these facts illustrate that throughout the high growth era, the government 
was friendly to relational/cross-shareholding. Backed by this pre-relational 
shareholding stance, the insider dominated ownership structure that was established 
by the early 1970s (Figure 1) was supported from a regulatory perspective by a pro-
relational shareholding framework.  
 
2.2.  Policy shift toward anti-insider ownership 
As seen in Figure 1, the ownership structure from 1970 until the early 1990s was 
fundamentally stable, with relatively low foreign ownership. The sudden fall in stock 
prices following the burst of the bubble in the early 1990s, along with global 
financializaton, became the main catalyst for foreign institutional investors to start 
making substantial shareholding acquisitions in Japan, as high stock prices had kept 
them away prior to the bubble (Amadjian 2007, Jacoby 2010). The upsurge of foreign 
investors thus began to alter the once strong insider-based shareholding structure.  
In the late 1990s, facing a financial crisis that centered on Japanese banks, the 
regulators started to make drastic decisions to limit the once problematic insider-
based shareholding structure. This was a significant policy change in Japan’s post-war 
financial history. A symbolic event was the enactment of the Order for Enforcement of 
the Act on Limitation on Shareholding by Banks and Other Financial Institutions 
(LSB Act) in 2001.  
The aim of the law was to reduce the bank shareholdings of client firms mainly 
because high equity holdings by banks could cause a significant contraction of lending 
under the BIS regulation and partly because the sales of equity holdings could 
contribute to the banks writing off non-performing loans (Miyajima and Kuroki 2007). 
Consequently, as shown in Figure 2, the percentage share held by banks and 
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insurance companies in the TSE dropped from approximately 30% in 1995 to less than 
10% in 2005. This contributed to a period of drastic change in the ownership structure 
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 1997 to 2004, and as banks began to unwind and 
dissolve their cross-shareholdings on a massive scale, the power balance shifted in 
favor of outsiders.  
Nonetheless, the unwinding of cross-shareholding does prima facie appear to halt 
by 2004. Likewise, based on data provided by Nissay Research Institute, Figure 3 
shows the strict sense of cross-shareholding: from 2004 to 2013, cross-shareholding 
among corporation remains substantially high, with little or no change. The 
dissolution of cross-shareholding reached its peak in 2004, when the LSB act set the 
deadline for companies to decrease their cross-shareholdings to a maximum of their 
TIER 1 equity capital (approximately 8% of their asset). On the other hand, the 
percentage share held by foreigners reached its peak of 28% in 2006. Hereafter, the 
ownership structure was once again stabilized (Figure 1). From Figure 3, cross-
shareholding clearly declined dramatically from 1996 to 2005 and that it then 
remained stable. This drastic change was mainly caused by the dissolution of cross-
shareholding between banks and corporation. 
 
== Figure 2 / 3 about here== 
  
There are two notable points on this phase. First, compared with the shareholding 
of banks and insurance firms, the shareholding of business corporations has in fact 
remained stable. The percentage share held by business corporations in the TSE 
continuously remained at approximately 30% in the early 1990s, as seen in Figure 2. 
Although the increase in shareholding market value by these corporations did 
however start to decrease in the early 2000s following a period of economic turmoil, 
compared to the rapid decline of bank shareholding from 15% in 1996 to 4% in 2012, 
the size of business firm shareholding in terms of market capitalization has remained 
stable and was approximately 22% in 2012.   
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       Second, strong market fluctuations following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
2008 subsequently forced many corporations to write off their relational shareholdings 
as capital losses (Miyajima and Nitta, 2011). This reminded the top management of 
firms that depending on the existing accounting system, keeping relational 
shareholding can be associated with higher risk. On the other hand, there was a 
growing understanding among institutional investors and policy-makers that 
relational or cross-shareholding by corporations could be one of the reasons for low 
firm performance partly because it created an inefficient use of capital and partly 
because it could be used as an entrenchment mechanism of top management to free it 
from market discipline. It was documented that the profitability of companies with 
higher cross-shareholding was lower than that of companies with low cross-
shareholding. (Miyajima and Kuroki, 2007, Ikeda et al. 2017)  
Following the reelection of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the government of Japan 
once again set out to resolve the cross-shareholding issue, assuming that cross-
shareholding could be one of the reasons for the low ROE of Japanese firms. The 
Japanese version of the Stewardship Code (JSC), which is based on the comply or 
explain principle, was introduced in 2014. The aim of the code was to engage 
otherwise noncontributing institutional investors in the business of the firms. 4  
Subsequently, unrelated to any actions of independent outside directors to encourage 
firms to disclose relational shareholdings, the corporate governance code (CGC), which 
was introduced in 2015, required firms to disclose the reason for maintaining 
relational shareholding. The main motivation of this requirement was to increase the 
return on equity by both realizing the efficient use of capital and by imposing the 
discipline of capital markets.   
Immediately after the CGC was introduced, the three largest banks in Japan, 
Mizuho Financial Group, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group and Sumitomo Mitsui 
                                                 
4
  The non-contributing institutional investors refer to the major institutional investors who do not actively 
engage in the business of the firms and increase its profitability. Such investors are usually characterized as 
insurance companies, banks and other domestic institutional investors, as well as the major Japanese Pension 
Funds. 
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Financial Group, assured regulators they would follow the new statutory reform and 
would accelerate the unwinding of cross-shareholding in 20155. However, note that 
in this stage, the main part of relational shareholding was no longer centered on 
banks, and cross-shareholding between banks and firms was not the major target of 
the policy. Note also that the remaining relational shareholding was very hard to 
dissolve because it was supported by mutual relationships between firms and was 
often associated with cross-shareholding. 
 
 
3. HOW TO UNDERSTAND RELATIONAL AND CROSS-SHAREHOLDING 
3.1.  The relationship between two companies 
The relational shareholding, which is an unique features of the ownership structure of 
Japanese firms, is different practice from the portfolio investment of firms. Different 
from portforio investment, which aim is to maximize the share value. The aim of 
relational shareholding is not limited to maximize share value, but either to maintain 
the control power over or keeping long-term relationship to firms in which they 
invested.  Although relational shareholding and cross-shareholding are overlapping, 
they are different concepts. The latter focuses on the ownership structure of a 
company, while the former focuses primarily on the financial (investment) policy of a 
firm. Therefore, whereas relational shareholding is not necessarily associated with 
cross-shareholding, relational shareholding it . A firm often held the and On the other 
hand, cross-shareholding will be primarily determined by the shareholder’s preference, 
as under mutual ownership, the issuer’s decision will be secondary in the sense that 
the issuer’s selling is seemingly induced by the shareholder’s selling. 
       Table 1 summarizes the firm characteristics in 2012 (just before the launch of 
Abenomics) among the firms in the first and fourth quartile in terms of their relational 
shareholding ratio and those in the first and fourth quartile in terms of their cross-
                                                 
5
 Nikkei June 1, 2015, Lewis (2015). 
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shareholding ratio.  The firms are mostly overlapping:  for holdings in both categories, 
63.1% of the firms in the top quartile the same, and 50.6% of the firms in the bottom 
quartile overlap. As a result of the overlap, the characteristics between the two 
categories appear the same. 
 
==  Table 1 about here == 
 
Compared the firm in the top 25% in the relational shareholding ratio with those 
in the bottom 25%, and the firms in the top 25% in cross-shareholding ratio with the 
firms in the bottom 25%, respectively, firms in the top of 25% of both categories on 
average are lower in profitability and volatility of performance, smaller in the market 
value, lower in the growth opportunities, capital expenditures, R&D, M&A, as well as 
lower in their percentage of foreign ownership,  
It is this inverse correlation between high relational / cross-shareholding and 
corporate performance to which the Abe cabinets and other policy-makers have paid 
serious attention.6   
Note that due to reverse causality, the exact causal relationship between high 
relational/cross-shareholding and low profitability, less volatility, and low growth 
opportunities is not clear: the decision to sell relational shareholding is voluntary, and, 
consequently, firms with low profitability and low growth opportunities are likely to 
keep their relational /cross-shareholdings to maintain a close relationship with other 
firms or due to their lack of institutional investors. This is exactly what happened 
during the 1997-2004 period, when the cross-shareholding of banks was rapidly 
dissolved (Miyajima and Kuroki 2007).  
However, once ownership structures were stable post-2006, it is highly plausible 
that the high relational shareholding caused low performance (low ROA, low return 
and less active investment). Miyajima and Nitta (2011), Miyajima and Hoda (2015), 
                                                 
6
 It used to be supposed that cross shareholding played positive role in Japanese economic growth. See, Aoki, 
1990), Abeglen and Stark (1985), Frath (1993),  Odagiri (1992).  
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Miyajima and Ogawa (2016) all reported that the high foreign or institutional 
ownership caused the low performance, while Ikeda, Inoue and Nagao (2018) 
documented that firms with high cross-shareholding were likely to have had low 
performance due to enjoying the so called “quiet life”. 
 
3.2  Preliminary Test 
To identify the effect of corporate governance reforms on relational shareholding, 
using the cross-shareholding ratio provided by Nissay Research Institute from 2005 to 
2017, we conduct a primary test on the determinants of the cross-shareholding among 
all listed firms in the TSE from 2005 to 2017. The reason for testing the cross-
shareholding instead of relational shareholding is that for all listed firms, only the 
cross-shareholding ratio is available for both the long term as well as the short term. 
To measure the determinants of cross-shareholding for the all TSE firms, we adopt the 
following model: 
 
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 =  𝐹(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠, 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝐺𝑜𝑣, 𝐶𝐺𝐶)        (1) 
 
where Cross is our dependent variable and denotes the percentage of cross-
shareholding, i.e., the aggregate percentage of issued-firm shares held by other 
companies whose shares in turn are held by the issued firm divided by the total 
outstanding shares of an issued firm. These data is provided by Nissay Research 
Institute.7 As explanatory variables, we exclusively focused on the variables related to 
a issued firm. Since this ratio, Cross, could also be decided by the characteristics of the 
shareholders side, the model is far more perfect. However, as preliminary approach to 
the issues, it would be helpful.  
Here, Port is the portfolio factor, which is proxied by using the actual book value of 
marketable securities to total assets, and it captures the inherent risk of each 
investment portfolio. Financial needs is a variable that captures the needs of a firm in 
                                                 
7
 Nikkei Cges provides the total shareholding ratio by a public company that can hold mutual shares. 
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the decision to keep or sell shareholdings, assuming that companies are expected to 
sell them if the firms are financially unhealthy: the debt to assets ratio is picked up as 
this proxy. The return on assets is used to control for a firm’s profitability. 
Entrenchment is a series of variables that could capture the perception of 
management to the market pressure, including the takeover threat. As proxies, we use 
the firm size and market valuation. Shares of firms that are small in size and or 
undervalued by the market are expected to be kept by other firms to deter takeover 
threats from aggressive outside shareholders. The Gov is a series of variables related 
to corporate governance arrangements, such as the domestic and foreign institutional 
shareholder ratios, each related to formidable monitoring incentives. Domestic 
institutional investors comprise the shareholding by trust banks and asset 
management firms to whom government and private pension funds have delegated 
their money to manage. Many of these domestic institutional investors have been 
passive but subsequent to the amendment of fiduciary duties in the early 2000s, were 
encouraged to actively use their voting rights. Unlike its domestic counterparts, 
foreign institutional investors were and are known for not staying silent and have 
therefore in many cases been treated as an outside threat to corporate management of 
many Japanese corporations.  
Last, we check for the effect of the CGC and control the interaction of the 
corporate governance factors. The CGC is captured by using a dummy variable that 
assumes the number 1 if the fiscal year is between 2014 and 2017.8  Estimation period 
is 2010-2017, the fixed effect model is applied. 
The results are shown in Table 2. Considering the fact that corporate 
management might urge other companies to increase cross-shareholding when debt 
increases, note the following three points:  First, the coefficient of the CG dummy is 
significantly negative, suggesting that following the CGC, firms were actively urging 
other companies to dissolve their shareholding in Japan. The magnitude is 
                                                 
8
 Although the CGC was introduced in 2015, corporate management was assumingly already prepared to 
decide to sell. Given this assumption, we choose to include 2014 to capture the effects just prior to the 
enactment of the CGC. 
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approximately 1.0%–3% on average. This effect was further verified through various 
robustness checks (including but not limited to year dummies for 2014, 2015, 2016, 
and 2017).  
 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
 
Second, the coefficient of domestic and foreign institutional investors is 
significantly negative, suggesting that, in actions unrelated to the CGC reforms, these 
investors actively encouraged corporate management to dissolve cross-shareholding. 
Third, conversely, after corporate governance reforms, institutional investors had a 
positive effect, which implies that the effect of the CGC is much stronger in firms with 
low institutional shareholding and that the role of the CGC is substitutional to the 
pressure of institutional shareholding. According to Model 3, suppose that a firm has 
foreign shareholding of zero %, 13.7% (median), and 30%: after the CGC reforms, the 
cross-shareholding decreases by -1.02% (CGC effect=-1.025%, the other pressure effect 
and the interaction term is zero), -0.84% and -0.63%, respectively. 
In summary, these estimates provide evidence that following the regulatory 
change, companies were actively seeking to dissolve cross-shareholding in companies 
listed on the First Section of the TSE. This effect is especially clear among firms with 
low institutional ownership, which were thus far less likely to sell their relational 
shareholding.  
However, taking cross-shareholding as a dependent variable is an indirect way 
for testing the policy effect because changes of cross-shareholding ownership may not 
be exclusively determined by the decision of the issued firms. Furthermore, ranging 
from the outsider- (institutional investors) dominated firms to the insider- (other 
corporations) dominated firms, the ownership structure of TSE firms was very 
diversified. To identify the consequences of the policy change, we conduct a test on the 
implicit target of the CG reforms, namely, the corporations with a high level of 
relational shareholdings. 
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4  DETERMINANTS OF SOLVING RELATIONAL SHAREHOLDING 
4.1    Data  
We now turn our focus to the direct shareholding of companies with a higher than 
average amount of relationship shareholding (Seisaku-hoyu kabu). Relationship 
shareholdings are one of the main focus areas of the CGC and refer to situations in 
which a company has relational shareholdings composed of block holdings and 
minority shareholdings, e.g., transactional relationships or stabilized equity structures. 
For listed firms with relational holdings, the CGC required the firms to explain the 
reason for their relational shareholding and to address its appropriateness (CGC, 
Principle 1.4). To provide an in-depth estimation of the direct effect of the CGC on 
relationship-based shareholding, a focus on firms with a higher relational 
shareholding ratio is a reasonable approach. Here, the rational shareholding ratio 
(RSR) is defined as the aggregated relational shareholding divided by total assets. In 
our sample, we include the top 25 percent of firms, which comprises firms with an 
RSR higher than the 75th percentile: we use the cross-shareholding ratio provided by 
Nikkei Cges in 2016.9  Given the availability of the information availability, out of 
those top 25 percent firms, we randomly select 200 firms as a sample of companies.  
   Table 3 provides a comparison of the market capitalization size and the relational 
shareholding to total asset ratio between all companies listed on the First Section of 
the TSE, the bottom 25% of firms in relational-shareholding, the top 25% of firms in 
relational-shareholding and the randomly selected sample of 200 firms. While the 
relational shareholdings to total assets ratio (RSR) for all listed companies varies from 
a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 53%, it is approximately 4.6% on average. In 
comparison, the firms in the top 25% have a substantial RSR, ranging from a 
minimum of 6% to maximum of 53%, with a mean of 10.3% and a median of 8.5%. 
Among those firms in the top 25%, we then randomly selected 200 companies 
                                                 
9
 Nikkei Cges only started to publish the data on the amount of relational shareholding /total assets in FY2016. 
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(excluding financial institutions). Here, the relational shareholding ratio varies from a 
minimum of 6% to a maximum of 37%. The sample average is 11.5% and does not 
differ from the average of the top 25% firms. Compared to the market capitalization 
size of both the top 25% and the bottom 25% firms, although not larger in terms of the 
maximum size, the market capitalization size of the sample, however, is substantially 
larger for almost all percentiles in the dataset. Using the disclosed information on 
each relational shareholding, we create an aggregated sample and control for each 
specifically disclosed cross-shareholding and omit entities that lack a securities code 
(mostly foreign).  
 
--- Table 3 About Here --- 
 
      For capturing the decision of a firm on relational shareholding, it is not 
appropriate to focus on the RSR based on its current value, as it is highly subject to 
the market fluctuations. Therefore, we use the actual number of shares of relational 
shareholding, which is available from the end of FY 2010, when the amendment of 
information disclosure rule first required firms to disclose the details of their 
relational shareholdings.10  
Table 4, row A shows the aggregated number of firms that sold at least one named 
stock from their relational shareholdings. In row A, the percentage of companies that 
decided to sell considerably increases from 36% in 2012 before the CGC to 51% in 2015 
and to 89% in 2017. Row B represents the aggregated number of named stocks in 
relational shareholdings for all 200 companies and those that were sold. A substantial 
increase in the decision to sell is also observed following the enactment of the CGC in 
2015. From 2015 to 2017, the total number of decisions to sell increased from 330 in 
2012, to 482 in 2015, and to 1073 in 2017; consequently, the probability of a relational 
shareholding asset being sold increased from 7% in 2012 to 21% in 2017.  
                                                 
10
 The amendment required all listed firms to disclose the following:  the name of the firms, the number of 
holding shares,  and the book and current values of those shares. 
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Last, row C shows the average number of sample firm decisions, which is the 
number of decisions to sell at time t standardized by the number of named stocks held 
at the beginning of t (i.e., at the end of t-1). It shows a discontinuous jump in 2015 
from the previous 2.7 level to 3.4 and reaches as high as 5.8 in 2017. The last row 
represents the total number of shares per firm, which following the CG reforms, 
declined from 26.9 million to 21.2 million, roughly a 22% reduction. 
 
--- Table 4 about here --- 
 
In light of these simple descriptive statistics, we posit that the CGC reform has 
been effective not only for all listed companies but also implicitly for the top 25% of 
relational-shareholding companies (the core of cross-shareholding companies) as well. 
To better understand the effects, we first estimate the aggregated data that may affect 
a company’s decision to sell relational shareholding.  
 
4.2 Decision of selling stocks  
We adopt the following model: 
 
𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑖 =  𝐹(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜, 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ, 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝐶𝐺𝐶)        (2) 
 
Here, the dependent variable is SND, denoting the total number of decisions at time t.  
As an explanatory variable, Portfolio is the proxy to capture the intrinsic value 
and risk of the relative size of relationship shareholding to total assets: we assume 
that management would liquidate sizable marketable securities to effectively lower 
risk. Unrealized capital is the ratio of the current fair market value over the acquired 
book value of the relational shareholding asset. It is expected that a low capital gain 
would be associated with the selling of relational shareholdings. As in the model in 
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section 3, financial health, on the other hand, aims to capture the financial needs, 
assuming that firms are more likely to sell when financial health deteriorates. The 
fiduciary duties of the major shareholders are captured via the governance proxy, as 
each shareholder is expected to act rationally and at the shareholders’ meeting, they 
are expected to actively vote to follow the CG reforms and dissolve each shareholding. 
We also add the activist dummy, which equals one if the activist funds with more than 
5% block shareholding can be identified in the previous firm year11 . Having an 
aggressive outsider shareholder present is generally assumed to affect the decision-
making: it is not clear whether the effect will cause corporate management to decide to 
increase the amount of cross-shareholding as a countermeasure or to choose to give in 
to the pressure and decrease the number of cross-shareholdings. The CGC is simply a 
dummy to capture the effect of the CGC reforms and equals one if a firm belongs to a 
firm year from 2014–2017.  Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables. 
 
--- Table 5 About Here --- 
 
The statistical summary has been divided into different categories for simplicity. 
First, row A represents the independent variable, NSD, the number of decisions 
standardized by the number of named shares at the beginning of time t: its mean is 
2.27. Row B represents the portfolio factor and includes the real size of relational 
shareholdings, i.e., the relational shareholdings balance sheet value to total assets and 
the unrealized capital gain. The acquired book value of the relational shareholding 
assets to total assets is on average 0.4%, while the current value over the book value is 
on average 2.09. Row C shows the statistics for each entrenchment factor. The 
financial needs in row D include the cash to assets ratio, the market capitalization size, 
Tobin’s Q, the debt to assets ratio, and a dummy variable for the interest coverage 
ratio; we use ICR as dummy variable, which equals one if the interest coverage ratio is 
below 2.   
                                                 
11
 For identifying the activist funds, we use Hamao and Matos (2018), Becht et al (2017) and a new list 
produced by Ryo Ogawa and Kazunori Suzuki. 
21 
 
Governance is covered in the last row, E, denoted by the domestic and foreign 
institutional investors’ shareholding ratio as well as the frequency of the activist 
dummy. Activist fund block shareholder situations, where an outside investor 
aggressively can acquire a substantial portion of voting rights in order to change a 
company to maximize profit often against the will of corporate management, are 
relatively common in the United States,; however, this is a relatively new phenomena 
in Japan12. Among our sample, the percentage of firms that have a block shareholder 
activist fund is only 3.3%. Furthermore, each governance factor has been estimated 
separately from CGC estimations.  
       Table 6 summarizes the estimation results. There are three points to be noted. 
 
== Table 6 about here == 
 
First, the portfolio factor and financial factors are basically working as we expected. 
The coefficient of the size of shareholding is positive, although not sufficiently 
significant. The coefficient of the unrealized capital gain is negative, with a 1% 
significant level, implying that a firm with the expectation of having on the whole a 
lower capital gain is likely to sell their relational shareholdings. On the other hand, 
firms with high debt and low Q are as likely to sell their relational shareholding. 
     Second, most remarkably, the SND is less likely when the outside ownership is 
high, which is in contrast to the previous section’s cross-shareholding estimation, 
where the cross-shareholding ratio is negatively correlated to the outsider ownership 
ratio. The coefficient of foreign and domestic institutional shareholding is all 
significantly negative, suggesting that firms with high outsider ownership are less 
likely to sell their relational shareholding. This fact is the main reason that those 
firms are called bedrock companies of cross-shareholding (Ganban Kigyo). 
                                                 
12
 Most famous in Japan is perhaps the takeover bid by Steel Partners, an aggressive activist investor, to buy all 
the outstanding shares in Bull-Dog Sauce in 2007.  In this situation, to effectively dilute the Steel Partners 
shares, the board of directors of Bull-Dog Sauce decided on an anti-takeover proposal, i.e., to take the poison 
pill. Ultimately, Steel Partners was forced to give up and sold all shares a year later. 
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      Third, similar to previous estimates, the CGC dummy is significantly positive, with 
a 1％ significance level, showing that the Corporate Governance Code once again has 
been effective. The magnitude of the CGC is approximately 0.8 to 0.9 (Models 1, 3, and 
5). If we include the interaction term between the CGC dummy and ownership, it is 
estimated from 1.3–1.5 (Models 2, 4, and 6), although the discouraging effect of 
institutional shareholders on dissolving relational shareholding is strengthened. 
Taking the same approach as that in section 3, suppose that firm has foreign 
shareholdings of zero %, the median of 8.5% and 30%; after the CGC reforms, the 
number of relational shareholding sales ranges from 1.3 for a firm with zero foreign 
ownership to 0.61 for a firm with median foreign ownership (CGC effect=1.33, 
constraint effect 0.36 and combined negative effect, 0.35) to -1.27 for firms with 30% 
foreign ownership. Thus result suggests that the CGC encouraged relational 
shareholding, but it was highly conditioned by the ownership structures. 
       As in its analysis, the estimation above uses the yearly number of firm decisions to 
sell relational shareholdings, we cannot identify what type of firm share is likely to be 
sold or the extent to which the mutual relationship (cross-shareholding) influenced the 
decision. Next, in order to address this issue, instead of considering the total number 
of firm sales as the unit of analysis, we estimate the determinants of the individual 
relationships on relational shareholding. 
 
4.4 Determinants of Individual relationship 
For estimating the determinants concerning each relational shareholding asset, we 
use the following estimation model.  
 
𝐷𝑆 =  𝐹(𝑋𝑖, 𝑌𝑗, 𝑍, 𝐶𝐺𝐶)            (3) 
 
Our independent variable, DS, is the decision of firm i to sell a firm j’s share and is a 
dummy variable which equals one if a share has been sold and zero otherwise (not a 
23 
 
sale or a purchase). As Table 4 shows, there are approximately 5000 total named 
stocks held by sample firms and 25 named stocks were originally held by a sample 
firm in 2012. On average, 2.74 out of 25 named stocks were sold in 2012, and the 
number sold increased to 5.79 in 2017. 
        For explanatory variables, the model includes the variable, Xi, denoting the 
characteristics of firm i; we employ the same proxies, namely, portfolio factor, financial 
needs, and entrenchment concern, as in model (2).  In addition, we introduce, Yj, 
denoting the characteristics, such as market capitalization, rate of return of stock and 
Tobin’s Q, of firm j,. XiYj is the portfolio factor of firm j, i.e., the book value of firm j 
over the total relational shareholding of firm i, i.e., the unrealized capital gain of firm j. 
The fourth variable is Zij, which captures the cross-shareholding between i and j. 
CROSS is firm j's shareholding of firm i, and is a dummy variable for capturing the 
mutual relationship. Another variable is COM, denoting firm i's shareholding of firm j:  
it represents the percentage share and captures the commitment of firm i to firm j. the 
expectation is that firm i is less likely to sell those firms in which it has a large stake. 
Table 7 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the dataset comprising the 200 
core cross-shareholding firms. The first row, DS, represents the decision to sell for 
each disclosed asset. On average, the probability of deciding to sell an asset among 
companies with high-relational shareholding is approximately 7%. The Xi rows 
include firm i’s investment portfolio, financial factors, and ownership structures. The 
Yj row shows the statistics for each entrenchment factor, and the XYij row shows the 
characteristics of each asset represented in the last panel. 
The sixth row provides information on Zj, a new variable of this estimation. This 
row includes a series of characteristics of firm j. Regarding the cross-shareholding 
relationship for which we use a dummy variable, CROSS is observed in 4351 out of 
39885 relational shareholdings (roughly 10% of the total relationships). As a reference, 
the average shareholding ratio of firmｊ to firm i is 2.5%, with a standard deviation of 
approximately 2.7%. Conversely, denoting company i’s shareholding of company j, 
COM is on average 0.3%.   
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--- Table 7 About Here --- 
 
Table 7 summarizes the estimation results on equation (3). Models 1 to 3 consider 
all firms, and in Models 4 to 6, the sample is limited to the relational shareholding of 
financial institutions, i.e., banks, insurance firms and trust banks, which comprise the 
main portion of all relationship shareholdings. First, concerning XYij, the portfolio 
factors, namely, the book value of the relational shareholding of firm j to the total 
relational shareholding of firm i and the unrealized capital gains of firm j, are all 
significantly positive. Management is therefore concerned over certain risk factors in 
terms of asset size or the unrealized capital gain of firm j, both of which ultimately 
increase the chances of a decision to sell such assets. Additionally, financial distress 
also plays a role when determining whether to decide to sell. In particular, in all 
industries, corporate management is more likely to sell when leverage is high, 
although this would not be the case for financial institutions. As for variables related 
to Yi,  the coefficient of size j is positive, while that of return is negative, suggesting 
that firm i is likely to sell shares that are easy to liquidate, as well as firm shares with 
low returns. 
       Understanding the financial factors reasonably explains the decision regarding 
individual relational shareholding; however, our concern is the effect of CGC and 
mutual relationships. First, the coefficient of the CGC dummy is significantly positive 
in all models. This result is in line with previous estimates and proves that the CGC in 
fact has encouraged corporate management to dissolve not only cross-shareholding 
among listed firms but also relational shareholding among firms within the top 25% 
(“Ganban Kigyo”).  
Second, the coefficient of COM is negative for the relational shareholding of firms 
in financial industries, suggesting that the high commitment of firm i to j is likely to 
result in the companies keeping their relational shareholding. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of Cross is negative, confirming that cross-shareholding relationships are 
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impediments to the sales of relational shareholdings. This is particularly the case for 
financial firms (Models 4–6). Most importantly, note that the interaction term of Cross 
and the CGC dummy is positive, suggesting that the impediments effect of cross-
shareholding could be mitigated by the CGC reform. According to Model 3, the 
discouraging effect of CROSS (-0.25) is almost offset by the interaction term (+0.22), 
implying that compared to the pre CGC period, in the period after the implementation 
of the CGC reforms, 80% of the discouraging effect in cross-shareholding was reduced.   
  
--- Table 8 About Here --- 
 
4.5 Summary 
In these estimates, we have shown that the CGC has been effective not only for all 
companies listed in the TSE but also for companies with high relational shareholdings 
(Ganban-kigyo). Through this in-depth view on cross-shareholding, we have proved 
that an increase in domestic and foreign institutional shareholders was unable to 
encourage corporate management to effectively mitigate the decision to dissolve cross-
shareholdings. Last, through our estimation on each particular asset, we confirm that 
there is an intercorporate linkage trying to encourage the CGC reforms. The 
interaction effect between the cross-investment of shareholding and the CGC 
mitigates this effect to some extent but not entirely. Conclusively, we have determined 
that the overall change has been positive, but there have been a few drawbacks, as 
previously noted.  
 
5. POST-REFORM FINANCIAL POLICY  
5.1 Myopic Managerial Decision Making  
In this final section, we aim to explore how corporations reallocate newly gained cash 
from selling relational shareholdings. The CG reforms aimed to make firms more 
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profitable via dialogue and the unwinding of the otherwise assumed unprofitable 
relational shareholdings. The government is focused on making firms reinvest their 
cash holdings to increase profitability, e.g., through active physical investment, 
research and developments and M&A. Managerial decision-making is however not 
easily budged. In many cases, poor corporate governance tends to foster the indulgence 
of corporations in less profitable management decisions, whereby many firms take on 
substantially higher levels of cash holdings (Harford et al. 2008, Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith, 2007). This effect has been observed in Japan for many years, as consistent 
with the understanding of weak corporate governance in Japan, market valuations of 
firms has been lower than those of U.S. firms in the 1990s (Kato, Li, and Skinner, 
2012).  
The decline of insider control throughout the 1990s drastically tilted the power 
balance of equity holders and proved to be a useful tool against entrenched corporate 
management, to improve corporate governance and to further unwind the deep-rooted 
cross-shareholding among firms (Miyajima and Ogawa 2016). To mitigate the threat of 
aggressive outside equity holders, some firms made large stock repurchases to prevent 
forceful takeovers (Stulz, 1998; Bagwell, 1991); however, the repurchased stock of 
Japanese firms was resold to insiders, thereby weakening the unwinding of cross-
shareholding (Franks, Mayer, Miyajima and Ogawa 2018). Similar managerial 
behavior has been observed, as short-term investments are effectively being used to 
bolster stock performance: this has resulted however in negative long-term 
consequences, as management is willing to trade off investments to increase the 
dividend payout ratio and share repurchases, which in turn increase agency problems 
(Edmans, Fang, and Huang, 2018; Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund, 2016).  
It is thus necessary to recognize the final use of sold shareholding assets, as these 
may affect the value of the firm and therefore also generate additional agency 
problems. This section addresses this issue. Our estimations take the same approach 
as that in Franks et al. (2018) who measure how management uses internal stock 
repurchase programs to coordinate the shareholding structure and deter outsider 
27 
 
threats. In addition, using our previous data on relational shareholding, to capture the 
short-term effects of managerial behavior on financial policy for share buybacks, 
dividend payouts as well as real investments, we include the number of decisions 
taken.  
 
5.2 Effect on Corporate Policy 
For addressing the decision of relational shareholding on corporate policies following 
the CGC reforms, our model follows that of Franks et al. (2018).  
 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖, 𝑡 = F(𝑄𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐺𝐶)   （4） 
 
Here, POL is a series of corporate policy variables. The first group is related to real 
investment: M&A, the amount of the increase of an asset by M&A to total assets; the 
ratio of CAPX physical investment to fixed assets; and R&D, the total R&D 
expenditure to total sales ratio. The second group is related to financial policy: 
buyback represents the ratio of the share buyback amount to the market 
capitalization of a company and is used to capture the relative size of each executed 
repurchase amount. Moreover, dividend is the yearly change in the dividend payout 
ratio, and cash holdings are standardized by the amount of total assets.  
Estimating real investment, we follow the standard investment function based on 
the Q theory and add financial factors such as cash flow and leverage. As explanatory 
variables, Q is the lagged Tobin’s Q, while CF is the lagged cash flow: we use them to 
capture the companies’ financial capabilities. Leverage is the debt to assets ratio. 
 Our main variable of concern is DES, the actual number of decisions taken to sell 
relational shareholding assets. To fully capture the effect of DES, we introduce DES at 
time t and DES in time t-1. CGC is a dummy for the CG reform years. The results are 
presented in Table 9, Panels A and B. 
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--- Table 9 about here --- 
 
Panel A shows the estimation results of the relational shareholding sales decision 
to the investment behaviors. The results show that highly leveraged firms are more 
inclined to decrease overall expenditures, as is seen in all models (1-6), while R&D and 
CAPX are constrained by cash flow. The number of decisions made to sell in either 
time t or in the previous year does not affect management’s decision to alter R&D, 
M&A, or CAPX 
Panel B shows the estimation results of the relational shareholding sales decision 
to the financial decision. Different from the effect on real investment, the sales 
decision has a significant effect. Whereas the actual number of decisions to sell does 
not significantly impact share buybacks, it significantly increases the yearly dividend 
payout ratio (model 3 and 4). Since the number of decisions of selling relational 
shareholding increased after the CGC, the effect could be understood as substantial. 
On the other hand, cash holding is also positively related to the number of decisions, 
implying that the dissolving of relational shareholding resulted in the increase of cash 
holding.  
Since the CG reforms are ongoing, it is too early to conclude their effect. Thus far, 
what we have found is that in post-reform decisions connected to the sales of a 
relational shareholding asset, corporations are more inclined to increase dividend 
payouts rather than investment as well as to increase short-term cash holdings once a 
decision has been made. 
In these concise estimates, we have shown that despite the intention of 
Abenomics, following the CG reforms, firms with substantial relational shareholding 
are more inclined to increase dividend payouts and cash holdings.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have shown that a series of corporate governance reforms that 
mainly comprised the Corporate Governance Code and the Stewardship Code 
regulations have been effectively implemented for dissolving relational shareholding. 
The companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange are now proactively seeking to re-
evaluate relational shareholding and determine its appropriateness. At the same time, 
domestic and foreign institutional shareholders have played active roles in 
encouraging corporate management to further dissolve cross-shareholdings for all 
listed companies, although not in conjunction with the CGC reforms.  
Given this situation, the CGC reforms also had a substantial impact on firms with 
substantial portions of relational shareholdings (“Ganban kigyou”). They were 
reluctant to dissolve the relational shareholdings in the face of the pressure of 
domestic and foreign shareholders. However, after the CG reforms were implemented, 
they began to sell their relational shareholdings. Similarly, firms with substantial 
portions of relational shareholdings were likely to keep their relational shareholdings 
of firms with which they have a cross-shareholding relationship. After the CG reforms, 
they also reduced their relational shareholdings of those firms. In these situations, the 
CG reforms had a substantial impact in dissolving the relational shareholdings among 
the bedrock firms (“ganban Kigyo”) 
Last, we find that inconsistent with the objectives of CG reform, firms that 
dissolved relational shareholdings are more inclined to increase dividend payouts and 
cash holdings rather than to increase actual investments (physical investment, R&D 
and M&As). As a tentative conclusion, we can say that the regulations might have 
partially contributed to the efficient use of capital, but they did not encourage the 
actual investment as originally planned in Abenomics.  
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Figure 1: Long-term trend of the Ownership Structures on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange  
 
Source: “Transition in Share Holding Ratio by Investor Category” by the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (2018). 
 
  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Foreigners Insiders Outsiders
35 
 
Figure 2: Bank and Business Corporation Shareholding Transition Amount 
(%)  
 
Source: “Transition in Share Holding Ratio by Investor Category” by the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
(2018). 
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Figure 3: Cross-shareholding Transition  
 
This shows the cross-shareholding transition for all companies listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange from 1986 until 2016. The cross-shareholding transition is the percentage of 
cross-shareholding, i.e., the aggregate percentage of shares held of company j’ which in 
turn holds company i’s shares: these data are provided by Nissay Research Institute.  
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Table 1: Comparative Statistics on companies before the CG reform. 
 
Note: These data contain average data on all companies listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange and was constructed using information from Nikkei Cges. Given the lack of data 
on relational shareholding, we used FY2016 as a conditional base year, which means that 
for the period 2005 until 2014, each company that falls within the top 25% (above the 75th 
percentile) is recognized as 1 and that each company in the bottom 25% (below the 25th 
percentile) is recognized as 0. Using these constraints, we then measure the difference 
between the top 25% and bottom 25% companies for each year before the CG reform in 
2015. The thresholds for relational shareholding asset size to total assets is 0.87% for the 
bottom 25% and 6.38% for the top 25. The cross-shareholding ratio, however, is 0.1% for 
the bottom 25% and more than or equal to 14.2% for the top 25%.  
 
 TSE Relational 
shareholding 
T-test of means Cross-
shareholding 
T-test of means 
 Top 25 Bottom 
25 
(Top - Bottom) Top 25 Bottom 
25 
(Top - Bottom) 
ROA 5,89% 5,22% 7,19% -1,96%*** 4,62% 8,68% -4,05%*** 
Cash Flow 6,20% 5,69% 7,40% -1,71%*** 5,36% 8,15% -2,78%*** 
Tobin's Q 1,16 1,05 1,30 -0,25%*** 1,00 1,48 -0,48*** 
Domestic Institutional Shareholder 22.89% 22,67% 24,47% -1,8%*** 19,89% 22,40% -2,51%*** 
Foreign Institutional Shareholder 13,72% 12,82% 15,80 -2,97%*** 10,89% 15,13% -4,24%*** 
Leverage 52,71% 48,31% 55,09 -6,77%*** 52,82% 50,29% 2,53%*** 
Total Assets (JPY Billion) 934,956 500,000 460,000 40,000 350,000 910,000 -560,000*** 
Market Cap. (JPY Billion) 222,723 160,000 230,000 -70,000*** 150,000 210,000 -60,000*** 
R&D to Total Sales 1.85% 2,60% 2,97% -0,37%*** 2,14% 2,57% -0,43%*** 
Capex to Fixed Assets 14.19% 13,05% 16,73% -3,68%*** 13,65% 18,16% -4,51%*** 
M&A to total assets 0.28% 0,24% 0,45% -0,21%*** 0,20% 0,46% -0,26%*** 
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Table 2: Cross-Shareholding on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Results. 
Note: This dataset was created by using information from Nikkei NEEDs Cges. The 
independent variable CSi,t is the cross-shareholding ratio and determines how many shares of 
the company are held by other companies, i.e., indirect ownership. The Corporate Governance 
Code is a dummy variable for the reform period between 2014 to 2017. Portfolio is the ratio 
between all held securities on the balance sheet to total assets. Size is the relative size of the 
firm and was created taking the natural logarithm of the market capitalization. Leverage is the 
ratio between debt and total assets. Domestic/Foreign is the shareholding ratio by 
Domestic/Foreign institutional investors. 
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
VARIABLES Cross Cross Cross Cross Cross Cross 
              
Portfolio -0.0174 0.494 0.0755 0.0723 0.818 0.234 
  (2.461) (2.454) (2.461) (2.409) (2.404) (2.411) 
Size 0.152 0.0159 0.136 0.196 0.142 0.203 
  (0.313) (0.308) (0.312) (0.283) (0.279) (0.282) 
Leverage 0.0315** 0.0292* 0.0307** 0.0298** 0.0271* 0.0287* 
  (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) 
Q 0.180 0.295 0.184 0.156 0.263 0.156 
  (0.212) (0.210) (0.212) (0.211) (0.208) (0.211) 
1. Domestic Institutional Investors -3.575***   -3.997***   
  (1.347)   (1.274)   
2. Foreign Institutional Investors  -4.127***   -4.824***  
   (1.436)   (1.470)  
3. Institutional Investors   -2.175***   -2.448*** 
    (0.738)   (0.709) 
CGC      -1.324*** -1.025*** -1.287*** 
     (0.370) (0.308) (0.351) 
CGC x 1 / 2 / 3    4.426*** 5.137** 2.664*** 
     (1.653) (2.142) (0.983) 
       
Constant 7.355** 8.762** 7.559** 7.247** 7.525** 7.202** 
  (3.577) (3.406) (3.574) (3.132) (3.100) (3.128) 
Observations 9,494 9,600 9,494 9,494 9,600 9,494 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Number of codes 2,305 2,332 2,305 2,305 2,332 2,305 
YES Dummy YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** denotes p<0.01, **denotes p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
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Table 3: Comparison of Relationship Shareholding between Listed Companies, 
Top 25%, and Bottom 25%. 
Note: The random selection process was created by using the newly constructed data on 
Relationship Shareholding from Nikkei NEEDs Cges. Given the insufficient information 
available and the time constraints, we focus on firms with high relationship shareholding asset 
size to total assets ratio, i.e., the top 25 percent of firms with a Relationship Shareholding ratio 
higher than the 75th percentile. The companies with high Relationship Shareholding are bound 
to be subject to intercorporate relationship pressure and are therefore a useful measurement 
when trying to determine the effects of the CGC reform. The market capitalization 
denomination is JPY in billions. 
 
 FY2016 N Mean Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
Tokyo Stock Exchange Market Capitalization 1952 254,309 1,8 16,956 44,339 146,015 19,900,000 
Cross-Shareholding (%) 1983 10.01 0 1.2 7.1 15.9 58.6 
Relationship Shareholding (%) 1744 4.59 0.01 0.93 2.87 6.48 52.71 
Bottom 25% Market Capitalization 438 274,565 3,113 17,111 39,309 124,369 8,088,818 
Relationship Shareholding (%) 438 0.35 0 0.11 0.31 0.58 0.86 
Top 25% Market Capitalization 565 204,177 2,346 17,891 50,663 155,394 3,999,527 
Relationship Shareholding (%) 562 10.25 0.08 6.65 8.49 12.01 52.71 
Sample Market Capitalization 200 256,076 4,13 22,44 57,568 209,239 3,999,527 
 Relationship Shareholding (%) 200 11.46 6.19 7.68 9.95 13.16 36.8 
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Table 4: The yearly decision on Relationship Shareholding. 
The first row A addresses the aggregate dataset for all 200 randomly selected companies. The 
second row B assesses the data provided from each company on each specific relationship 
shareholding and is the total number of assets held for all 200 companies. In the third panel, 
we address the average total number of decisions taken to sell the Relationship Shareholding 
assets for all 200 companies as well as the total number of shareholdings. The decision to sell is 
determined when a company chooses to decrease or liquidate an acquired Relationship 
Shareholding asset. The total number of decisions taken to sell a Relationship Shareholding 
asset is the aggregate of the previously explained term.  
 
 Fiscal Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
A A. Number of Companies in the Dataset 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
B. Total Decisions to sell 57 72 57 80 101 150 178 
(B) / (A) (%) 29% 36% 29% 40% 51% 75% 89% 
         B A. Total Number of relationship assets held by 200 companies 4948 5006 5083 5183 5082 5125 5151 
B. Decisions to sell 330 347 326 337 482 737 1073 
(B) / (A) (%) 7% 7% 6% 7% 9% 14% 21% 
         C Number of Decisions taken to sell assets 2.74 2.89 2.84 2.69 3.35 4.31 5.79 
Total Number of shares held (Millions) 26.3 25.5 26.9 26.8 27.1 24.1 21.2 
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Table 5: A Company’s decision on Relational Shareholding Summary. 
Note that this dataset was constructed by using the newly published securities report. The cash 
to assets, market capitalization, Tobin's Q, debt to assets, domestic institutional investors, 
foreign institutional investors, and the independent outside directors were collected by using 
information from Nikkei Cges. The interest coverage ratio was constructed by using data from 
Nikkei Financial Quest. Activism was created with the help of Ogawa, Ryo and is a dummy 
variable that determines whether the company has had or has an aggressive activist fund block 
shareholder and is constructed using the activist fund list provided by Hamao and Matos (2011).  
 
 VARIABLES N mean Std.D. 
A Number of Decisions to Sell 1600 2.270 2.830 
     
B Portfolio (shareholdings / Total Assets) 1598 0.005 0.02 
 Unrealized Capital Gain 1600 2.09 1.59 
C Market cap.  (JPY in billions) 1600 222,545 504,680 
Tobin's Q 1595 1.08 0.437 
D Debt to Assets 1600 0.427 0.167 
Interest Coverage Ratio 1600 0.022 0.009 
 Cash to Assets 1599 0.146 0,091 
     
E Domestic Institutional Investors 1600 0.183 0.135 
Foreign Institutional Investors 1600 0.085 0.107 
 Activist Funds Dummy 1600 0.033 0.180 
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Table 6: A Company’s Decision on Relational Shareholding Results (Aggregated). 
Note: SND represents the number of decisions to sell. Shareholding Size is the relative asset 
size of all held relationship shares to total assets (Relational Shares / Total Assets). The 
Unrealized Capital is the ratio between the acquired book value of the relationship 
shareholding asset and the current fair market value. The ICR is a dummy variable, which is 
one if the ICR is lower than two and zero otherwise. Cash is the cash holdings of a company and 
standardized by total assets. Leverage refers to the ratio of debt to total assets. Q represents 
Tobin’s Q. Size is the natural logarithm of the company’s market capitalization. Activism was 
created with the help of Ogawa, Ryo and is a dummy variable that determines whether the 
company has had or has an aggressive activist fund block shareholder and is constructed by 
using the activist fund list provided by Hamao and Matos (2011). Domestic refers to the 
shareholding by domestic institutional shareholders, while foreign represents the shareholding 
ratio by foreign institutional investors. The CGC refers to the Corporate Governance Code and 
is a dummy variable for the years from 2014 to 2017.  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
VARIABLES SND SND  SND  SND  SND  SND  
              
Shareholding size 0.0513 0.0539 0.0504 0.0555 0.0503 0.0554 
  (0.0371) (0.0371) (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0366) 
Unrealized Capital Gain -0.307*** -0.295*** -0.256*** -0.234*** -0.256*** -0.234*** 
  (0.0626) (0.0626) (0.0617) (0.0620) (0.0617) (0.0620) 
ICR 0.208 0.251 0.215 0.205 0.215 0.205 
  (0.464) (0.463) (0.457) (0.456) (0.457) (0.456) 
Cash  0.995 0.850 0.911 0.779 0.913 0.780 
  (0.975) (0.975) (0.964) (0.962) (0.964) (0.962) 
Lag Leverage 3.128*** 3.140*** 2.808*** 2.853*** 2.811*** 2.855*** 
  (0.533) (0.533) (0.530) (0.529) (0.530) (0.529) 
Lag Q -1.250*** -1.214*** -1.245*** -1.209*** -1.245*** -1.209*** 
  (0.213) (0.213) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210) 
Size 0.721*** 0.700*** 0.750*** 0.704*** 0.751*** 0.705*** 
  (0.0815) (0.0817) (0.0756) (0.0768) (0.0757) (0.0769) 
Lag Aggressive Shareholder Dummy 0.160 0.184 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.187 
  (0.393) (0.392) (0.387) (0.386) (0.387) (0.386) 
CGC 0.925*** 1.491*** 0.819*** 1.327*** 0.820*** 1.330*** 
  (0.159) (0.254) (0.157) (0.224) (0.157) (0.225) 
1. Lag Domestic Institutional Investors -4.534*** -2.888***         
  (0.698) (0.905)         
2. Lag Foreign Institutional Investors      -0.0728*** -0.0431***     
      (0.00792) (0.0122)     
3. Lag Institutional Investors         -0.0720*** -0.0427*** 
          (0.00785) (0.0121) 
CGC x 1 / 2 / 3   -2.739***   -0.0417***   -0.0412*** 
    (0.958)   (0.0131)   (0.0130) 
       
Constant -4.695*** -4.867*** -5.072*** -5.031*** -5.081*** -5.041*** 
  (0.922) (0.924) (0.886) (0.884) (0.886) (0.884) 
Observations 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 
Number of firms 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. 
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Table 7: Relational Shareholding Assets Summary. 
Note: This dataset was constructed by using the newly published securities report. DS, is the 
number of decision to sell. The explanatory variables include portfolio factors, financial needs, 
entrenchment concerns, and governance factors. Adding to these factors, we introduce firm j 
characteristics, such as market capitalization and the rate of return of stock j. Last, we add firm 
j's shareholding of firm i, which is a dummy variable for capturing the mutual relationship or 
cross-shareholding relationship between companies, and firm i's shareholding of firm j, which is 
the shareholding percentage for capturing the commitment of firm i to firm j. The cash to assets 
ratio, market capitalization size, Tobin’s Q, debt to assets ratio, and 1-year average stock 
returns were collected from information form Nikkei Cges, while the interest coverage ratio was 
constructed by using data from Nikkei Financial Quest. Company j’s Shareholding of Company 
i was constructed by using the Top 30 shareholders list provided by Toyo Keizai.  
 VARIABLES N mean sd 
Dependent DS: Decision to Sell 51,984 0.07 0.25
5 
     Xi: Portfolioi, t Relational shareholding/total asset    
Unrealized Capital Gain 19,205 2.70 3.60 
     Xi: 
Entrenchment
i,t 
Market Cap. Firm i (Billion) 40,165 26,87
37 
56,2
42 
Tobin's Q i 36,300 1.072 0.45
8 
Xi: Financiali.t Cash to Assets 51,984 10.9 9.4 
Debt to Assets i 36,300 43.8 17.0 
Interest Coverage Ratio 40,165 178 650 
     Yj:Characteris
tics,j,t 
Market Cap. Firm j (Billion) 39,885 108.7 227 
Tobin's Q 39,885 1.09 0.55 
 1 Year Avg. Stock Return j 39,885 4.1 10.2 
XYij: asset 
characteristics 
Book Value j / Total Relational shareholding i  40,155 40.5 121 
 Unrealized Capital Gain j 19,205 2.70 3.60 
Zij: Cross-
shareholding 
CROSS: Percentage of No. of i’s share held by firm j/ no 
of whole issued firm i  
4,351 2.5 2.7 
 COM: Pecentage of No of firm j’s share held by firm i / 
no of  shares issues firm j 
39,885 0.3 1.2 
   
  
44 
 
Table 8: Decision on Relationship Shareholding (individual relationship). 
Note: The decision to sell refers to one of the 200 randomly selected companies, while B refers 
to a hold relationship share. BV/CS is the book value of a relational shareholding asset to total 
asset size of all relational shareholding assets. The gain represents the unrealized capital gain 
or loss of holding shares for relationships. The ICR is the Interest Coverage Ratio Dummy 
assuming 1 when the ICR ratio falls below 2. Cash is the cash to total assets ratio. Q is Tobin’s 
Q. Size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of a company. Cross captures the 
effect occurring when Company j’ holds shares in Company i who also holds shares in Company 
j. COM is the ratio of the number of shares held by Company i to Company j’s total number of 
outstanding shares. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Industry All All All Financial Financial Financial 
VAR Decision Decision Decision Decision Decision Decision 
       Lag Portfolio 0.0689*** 0.0689*** 0.0685*** 0.0577*** 0.0577*** 0.0563*** 
 (0.00811) (0.00811) (0.00813) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) 
Lag Gaini,j 0.000866*** 0.000866*** 0.000867*** 0.00102*** 0.00102*** 0.00102*** 
 (2.68e-05) (2.68e-05) (2.68e-05) (5.69e-05) (5.69e-05) (5.70e-05) 
Lag ICRi 0.0523 0.0523 0.0469 -0.0339 -0.0339 -0.0397 
 (0.0843) (0.0843) (0.0842) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) 
Cashi -0.530 -0.530 -0.500 -1.840** -1.840** -1.780** 
 (0.413) (0.413) (0.413) (0.783) (0.783) (0.785) 
Lag Leveragei 0.915** 0.915** 0.926** 0.0844 0.0844 0.127 
 (0.427) (0.427) (0.427) (0.736) (0.736) (0.738) 
Qi -0.111 -0.111 -0.108 -0.245 -0.245 -0.244 
 (0.0731) (0.0731) (0.0729) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) 
Sizei -0.0425 -0.0425 -0.0427 0.139 0.139 0.139 
 (0.0844) (0.0844) (0.0844) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) 
Returnj -0.577*** -0.577*** -0.575*** -1.676*** -1.676*** -1.690*** 
 (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.350) (0.350) (0.351) 
Sizej 0.0307*** 0.0307*** 0.0307*** 0.0241 0.0241 0.0245 
 (0.00764) (0.00764) (0.00765) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) 
COMi,j 0.0117 0.0117 0.00598 -1.624* -1.624* -1.576* 
 (0.166) (0.166) (0.165) (0.935) (0.935) (0.932) 
Crossb,a -0.0905* -0.0905* -0.250** -0.391*** -0.391*** -0.803*** 
 (0.0540) (0.0540) (0.105) (0.133) (0.133) (0.285) 
CGC  1.684*** 1.665***  1.591*** 1.572*** 
  (0.0628) (0.0635)  (0.109) (0.109) 
CGC x Crossj,i   0.218*   0.559* 
   (0.119)   (0.313) 
Constant -0.595 -2.279** -2.274** -2.347 -3.937** -3.954** 
 (1.005) (0.985) (0.986) (1.937) (1.899) (1.904) 
       Observations 29,266 29,266 29,266 8,968 8,968 8,968 
Company Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.288 0.288 0.289 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1 
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Table 9 The effect of dissolving relational shareholding on corporate behaviors 
 
Note: The model here uses the same approach as that of Frank et. Al. (2018) and was 
constructed by using data from the Nikkei Value Search and Nikkei Cges. The buyback is the 
share buyback amount to market value. R&D is the ratio between R&D to total sales. M&A is 
the ratio between M&A to total assets and Capx is the ratio between capital expenditure and 
fixed assets. Buyback is the ratio between the share buyback amount to the total market 
capitalization size. Dividend is the change in the yearly dividend payout ratio, and cash 
holdings is the ratio between cash and total assets. Decisions are the total number of decisions 
taken to dissolve relational shareholding assets ratio to the number of held companies. CGC is 
a dummy variable for the Corporate Governance Code.  
 
Panel A: R&D, M&A, and CAPX. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES R&D  R&D  M&A  M&A  Capx Capx 
              
Lag Q -0.497*** -0.520*** 0.0528 0.0802 1.638** 1.831** 
 (0.0645) (0.0670) (0.119) (0.123) (0.740) (0.768) 
Lag Cash Flow 0.00801* 0.00828* 0.00460 0.00430 0.301*** 0.299*** 
 (0.00477) (0.00477) (0.00862) (0.00862) (0.0547) (0.0547) 
Lag Leverage -0.0278*** -0.0257*** -0.0183** -0.0207** -0.134*** -0.151*** 
 (0.00414) (0.00442) (0.00758) (0.00806) (0.0475) (0.0506) 
Decisions -0.00476 -0.00676 0.00824 0.0106 -0.0407 -0.0243 
 (0.00630) (0.00648) (0.0116) (0.0120) (0.0723) (0.0743) 
Lag Decisions -0.00881 -0.0110 -0.0114 -0.00880 -0.0175 0.000495 
 (0.00776) (0.00793) (0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0889) (0.0909) 
CGC  0.0496  -0.0586  -0.407 
  (0.0376)  (0.0682)  (0.431) 
       
Constant 4.387*** 4.304*** 0.907** 1.004*** 15.16*** 15.84*** 
 (0.201) (0.211) (0.367) (0.384) (2.309) (2.418) 
Observations 1,275 1,275 1,318 1,318 1,275 1,275 
R-squared 0.082 0.083 0.007 0.008 0.049 0.049 
Number of firms 195 195 200 200 195 195 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. 
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Panel B: Dividend, Share Buybacks and Cash Holdings. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Buyback Buyback Dividend Dividend Cash Holdings Cash Holdings 
              
Lag Q 0.00146 0.00781 0.0904*** 0.0782*** 0.0302*** 0.0284*** 
 
(0.0300) (0.0311) (0.0228) (0.0236) (0.00457) (0.00474) 
Lag Cash Flow 0.00190 0.00183 0.00476*** 0.00488*** 0.000679** 0.000697** 
 
(0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00164) (0.00164) (0.000330) (0.000330) 
Lag Leverage 0.000149 -0.000357 -0.00134 -0.000368 -0.00167*** -0.00152*** 
 
(0.00185) (0.00197) (0.00141) (0.00149) (0.000283) (0.000300) 
Decisions -0.000700 -0.000144 0.00655*** 0.00547** 0.00123*** 0.00107** 
 
(0.00291) (0.00300) (0.00222) (0.00228) (0.000444) (0.000457) 
Lag Decisions 0.00546 0.00605* 0.000593 -0.000547 0.000389 0.000221 
 
(0.00358) (0.00366) (0.00272) (0.00278) (0.000546) (0.000558) 
CGC 
 
-0.0132 
 
0.0255* 
 
0.00377 
  
(0.0172) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
(0.00262) 
       
Constant -0.0129 0.00753 0.00496 -0.0344 0.178*** 0.173*** 
 
(0.0901) (0.0940) (0.0686) (0.0714) (0.0138) (0.0143) 
Observations 1,343 1,343 1,343 1,343 1,343 1,343 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.042 0.046 0.105 0.106 
Number of firms 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. 
 
 
 
